Producers and lenders seek to avoid agricultural production-related risks through various managerial and institutional mechanisms. For individual farmers and agribusinesses, risk management involves choosing among alternatives for reducing the effects of risk on the firm, thereby affecting the firm's welfare position. Risk management often requires the evaluation of tradeoffs between changes in risk, expected returns, entrepreneurial freedom, and other factors. Research on risk management issues in agriculture has been among the main topics of interest of the Regional Research Committee for Financing Agriculture in a Changing Environment: Macro, Market, Policy, and Management Issues, and its predecessors. This paper reviews and summarizes much of the Committee's work and provides a discussion of related topics of interest for prospective future research. 
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allnnalfV'e meM.J'U.r'e olbu..stntu rule. Barry. 1987 factors. Some rtsk lllllJla,l(ement strategies reduce risk wtlhlo the llnn's operation, others trnnsfer risk outside Ule llrm, and sUII others buUd the Om1's capacity to bear risk {such as maintaining liquid n-ts).
Just and Pope {200 1) point out that runners have dJJfercnt altitudes toward ri,k, which Is consistent \\~Ul the findings of Cood'lll1.n and Kastens (1993) To C!Valuate whether var1ous rtskrnru>agtmcnt tools and stmtegles are efTccllve In achl~nf! manajlcrtal goals r~lnl! rtsk, ll Is csscnUal to expres" rtsks ln quanUtaUve terms. SubstanUal rc.,..arch has bten conducttd esumaung the price and ylt>ld rt.'k f.~ced by fanners ( Kff. 1998, 2001: Goodwin. 1994: Ker and 
Management Strategies

Dfverai.ftcation
The Farm Credit S}'>'tem c.11panded Ill> agricultural dcbtln the 1970s comp:u'ed to other lenders. Farm flnandnl strc,.,; during the early 19808 placed agrtcultul"dl finandal intennedturtcs In o prt-cnrtous sttuatJon . Since the l'onn Credit Sy91em was the largest farm re11l e~~tnte lender, 11, was the most severely affected Onan~lal intermediary durtng periods or farm SIJ'e<.S. Moss and Fcatherslonr ( 1988) 
Information
Jn n Purdue Unlverstly SUI~lcy study of large-scale fanners. agrtcu ltural lenders. 01J1d professional farm managers. UUcrtch and Patrick (1995) B.~ker. 1984: Collins. 1985) . Using panel data from Kanoas over the period [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] . a nd nssuoung maximization or the expected utlllty or returns to cqutty. Jen. osen and Langemeler (1996) lnvt'SU,I(utc opUmal leverage and the factors aiTcctlnl( leverage. Based on Ulelr findinl(s. l ev~e ts a.!Tcctrd theoretically and empirically by tax I>OIIcy, risk. fnrm profl toblllty. and growti' rate In the ''alue or assets.
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The relnllonships among business risk ( Gabriel and Baker. 19801. profitability (Collins. 1985) , price supports (Featherstone et al .. 1988 Equilibrium 3nalysls under r1sk evaluates a firm's I)()SSible responses to r.hanges In the r1sk characteristics of Its envlronmenl. Barry and Robtson ( 1987) 
LlquJdlty and Financial Reserves
A .rudy by Burghardt and Robison (1 984) explains the application of a computer slnnolauon noodcl built to facilitate the cx:aminntion of a ltemallve rtskmanngement strategi<'S on agricultural firms' liquidity. llnancla l stress. and Investment management under uncertainty. Their model was designed to Integrate financial strategies wtth production. murkeling, and riskmanagement strategies of typical Midwest cash grain farms.
Chhikara (1986) developed a model based on the expected ·utlllty paradigm to explain an agricultural firm's demand for cash and credit reserves (I.e .. unused credit or borrowing powt:r) as a response to risk. In general. he conflm1ed empirical support for the model when he tested It using data from Illinois farms. Chhikara found that Uquldit:y valu e curves declined monotonically With debt levels. lmplylng credit reserves quickly lost their liquidity value for !lnanctally stressed farms. Based on this result. credit reserves were of Uttle uS<' to distressed farms as a rlsknl:lnal(emenr tool.
Finance theory suAAests that Increases In 1\nanctal leveraj!e ratse the e.'<J)«tcd level nnd varlnblllty of returns on a farm's equity capital. prm1ded the returns on """"ts aceed the cost of borroWing.
Because risk attitudes (and expectations) may differ among farmers. lt is plausible to expect a wtde ranl(e of optimal !lnanclal structures. Cwtnn. Barry. and E:Utnger (1992) The co•~>• 11 11<1 benefits from using crop Insurance 111l\Y differ based on the deMI!,'l'l of the lnSir<ll1H'nt l'ho~cn by the producer. Wan!( el nJ . ( 1997) study the relative perfonnanC' <" of lndMdual·.)'l~ld and areayield crop lt"urnnce progmms. The usc of derlvatJves by lending tnstJtuUons was the focus of a study by Yang and L-eatham ( 1996) . They reviewed the u•e of interest ra te der1vntlve$ by major lenders to agr1culture. more specifically commercial banks. thrill Ins titutions. and life Insurance companies. They also discussed the beneOt.s and r1sks of using tl.nanclal der1v:tttves by s uch insllluttons.
liedglng In flnanclnl futures markets can offset the doUar loss on the loan (addiUonallntercst cost due to rising rates) with a I(IUn in the futures market. I-euck and l,.euthold (19841 examined the usc~ of hedging by grn!n elevators on variable rate debt and cortcluded grain elevator managers could reduce Interest nt te risk nnd the cost of debt by hedging borrowed debt In the llna nclal rutures market. Further. the au thors tound lhot hedl(tng costs were usually greater for private grain elevators thun for cooperaUvc ele-•ators because the cost of debt for the fom>er was rellected by the prime rate~ and """~ more volaUie than for coopernUves.
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Financial futures are useful lor hedging positions In situations In which there is symmetry of !(Sins and losses. In the cn.sc or asymmetrical gains a nd losses. a convenuonn l futures market hedge rnay only re\•erse the .symmetry. Thus. risk would not be reduced ctllclcnUy. If at all. A potentially u..cful risk-management tool applicable to these cases Is an OJ) IIon. Leatham and Baker ( 1984) discussed mcU1ods of using financial OI>Uons by providing background Infonnntton about options on financial futures and then lllustroUn!1 a hypothetical hedgtng situation. Tiw authors suggested that call options would serve banks and lenders bell cr for llxrd-rate loans.
Fnnners· use of fu tures and optlotl. S to hedge grOWing and s tored crops can reduce p1iee risk and d<'CI'ease the vana11ee on the returns to equity. Turvey and Baker ( 1988) 
Production and Marketing Contracts
A study by Dodson (1996) ar>d it'Ming was lh1· most rlsk-cfllden l choloe for risk prrferrlng fanners. H010.evcr. Peden.on caul lOlled that results were quJte l<<'n51Uie to the futUJ'\' dynamics of totcrest "'"'"· to Umes of financial Crisis In ngrtculture. greater emplulsls has been placed on mea..<urtng farm Rnanctal performance. In much oftht' lltcruture. the debt-to-a. sset rntlo Is used"" an lndtcutor ofRnancta l stress. Ellinger a11d llnrry (1987) (2002) co~ptuallzcd th~ risk -adjusted valuation of <'ash \'ersus share I~ for fanners and l:mdowners. and tested their model using Cann-le--cl data from Illinois. In parUculllr. the authors empirically detcnnlned how rental spreads b<>tween cash and sbate leases are related to rtsu and other farm charactt•rlsllca They concluded that non· rl.sk factors al'e Ukely to be the prtmnry dctennlnants of I he mngrutudc and sii!Jl of the renwl Aprcad. nnd point out that hlr;:h cash rents may be a bidding strategy to control odd!Uonal leased a.-reage Md thus expand fann size.
External Equity
Advantages and disadvnntagr" of resorting to ext<:mal eqUity ns a means co reduce risks und/or tocl't'Ming caplll\1 were addt·essed by Lowenberg·D•I'loer et al. (19871. Overall. they argu(·{( that exlemal equity was not likely to be an economically vloble strategy. becnu~~e of lt.w rclnllvely Wgh trnnsaetiOn cosl.s and the potential dlstoruon of management lncenu,..,. HOYo'<'\~r. they stl'eSsec:l that their conclu~IOns were limited by the: small amount o( research avallllble regarding u~e of external equity by farms. and by proprietary ftrms In general. '11'•<1r study concluded with a long ll•t of topics of rctcvnnce for futuJ'c 1-esearch In lhc are-a .
Off·Fann Income ancl lnve• tments
Oe<'egulauon of llnanctnl markets In the late 1980& P""ided frumers wtth new opportuniUes to dJ\'ei"Slfy U1dr ln~nts Into ofT-farm ftnanctal MselS. Howe-·er. sun--ey data on South Dakota farmers. collected and annlyzed by Gustafson and Monke. S...,hiJ~. end Pederson (1990) employed blstorlrnl data for 1966-1988 together w11h stochastic dom inance analysts to tnvatlflal~ pr~-rellrement ln\~tment strnlegldl for farmers. and otrf<lmllnvestmcllls In particular. Based on their results. nhno"t n il risk-averse fanners wou id lftVor a dl"""'lfi~ portfolio over any slnl(lc re(u or finnnriAI asset. bul domlnant]>Clrtfollos typlrnlly lm'Oh't'dj u sl h~o•o or· three o..ssc:ls &hnltkey and l.ff (19951 reported that fannland accounted for a substantlnl proportion of the nSSC:b hdd by Ohio fanncn~ln the~ 1990s. 1hey used hislortcal data ln a rm:nn·v:u1:tnce portfolio framework to demon~I.J'Iltc that dlverstf)1ng ln•-estments Into ofT f"rm financtal assets MCshro and Lcncc 141 (e.g .. stocks and bonds) may ttllow fanners to achieve a better comblnntlon of expected ~tum and varian« of ~turns than portfoHos comprised mostly of farmlnnd. Betubtza and Leatham (1990) 
Ag:rl.cultural Lenders and Rlslr. Management
According to Collins and Barry ( 1986 Belonlila and Gilbert (1989) used data from agricultural banks for 1984-1988 to a&Sess whether banks that falled 0\'<!1' this period did so because of their risk· managenlCJil s 1 rategles. They concluded fl'lllcd banks were exposed to more risks than surviving banks. supporting the hypothesis that vulnerability to failure rellected management portfoUo decisions. 
Issues for Future Research
